For almost six decades, investors have studied Berkshire Hathaway for lessons on how to allocate capital. The events of 2026 offer a rarer lesson: what a well-run succession looks like, and how to judge whether the discipline behind a great business survives the departure of its founder.
On 18 September, Warren Buffett, now 96, stepped down as chairman, a position he had held since 1970. He becomes chairman emeritus and stays on the board. His son, Howard Buffett, takes over as non-executive chairman, while Greg Abel, Chief Executive since January, continues to run the company.
The change in title matters less than what has happened around it. Over the past three quarters, Berkshire has bought back its own shares, completed a large acquisition, built a sizeable stake in a listed company and signalled patience in Japan. Each offers a lesson that applies well beyond one company.
Succession is a risk investors rarely price
Most investors analyse a company's products, margins and balance sheet. Far fewer ask what happens when the person who built it leaves. Yet for long-term holders, a poorly handled succession can destroy more value than a weak quarter ever could.
Berkshire separated the two jobs at the top deliberately. The Chief Executive allocates capital and oversees the operating businesses. The chairman leads the board and acts as custodian of the culture. Howard Buffett has sat on Berkshire's board since 1993, so he brings more than three decades of familiarity with how the company works.
The arrangement was flagged years in advance and carried out as described. That is a test worth applying to any holding: did management say clearly what would happen, and then do it? A transition that unfolds exactly as communicated is a sign of good governance, not merely good fortune.
Buybacks only make sense below fair value
A share buyback is not automatically good for shareholders. Buying back stock for more than it is worth transfers value from the owners who stay to those who sell. Berkshire's policy has long been to repurchase shares only when management believes the price sits below a conservative estimate of 'intrinsic value', meaning what the business is worth based on the cash it can generate over time.
Under Abel, that policy has been applied with conviction. Berkshire resumed buybacks on 4 March 2026, its first since May 2024. It spent roughly US$234 million in the first quarter, then about US$4.5 billion in the second, the largest quarterly amount since 2021. Abel has also said he will use his after-tax salary to buy Berkshire shares.
The lesson is to ask two questions of any buyback: what price is being paid, and does management have a record of buying only when shares are cheap? When a disciplined team buys its own stock, it is stating that the business is worth more than the market recognises. Done at the right price, buybacks lift each remaining owner's share of the business without any action on their part.
Buying when sentiment is weak
Two decisions recent show how Berkshire approaches an industry that is out of favour.
On 24 July 2026, Berkshire completed its purchase of US homebuilder Taylor Morrison for US$72.50 a share in cash, valuing the company's equity at about US$6.8 billion. Taylor Morrison will be combined with Clayton Properties Group, Berkshire's existing collection of 15 regional homebuilders. Together they delivered nearly 23,000 homes in 2025 across 21 states, making the combined business the fourth-largest homebuilder in the United States.
Berkshire also more than doubled its holding in Lennar, another major homebuilder, during the third quarter. It now owns about 11% of the company, roughly 26 million shares worth around US$2.1 billion. Because the stake now exceeds 10%, Berkshire must disclose further purchases within two business days.
A reasonable reading is that Berkshire is taking a long view of American housing. A shortage of homes, steady household formation and the prospect of lower interest rates over time could all support demand and affordability in the years ahead. Berkshire is not trying to call the bottom of the cycle. It is building scale in an essential industry while sentiment is subdued, consistent with Buffett's long-held view that it rarely pays to bet against America.
The broader lesson is that periods of weak sentiment are often when long-term owners can buy quality assets at sensible prices, provided they are prepared to wait.
Patience in Japan, and the limits of public filings
Berkshire's stakes in Japan's five major trading houses (Itochu, Marubeni, Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo) are among its largest commitments outside the United States. It first invested more than six years ago.
Abel made his first visit to Tokyo as Chief Executive on 2 and 3 September 2026, meeting the leadership of each company and of insurer Tokio Marine. He described the holdings as investments Berkshire plans to keep for decades, and said each company has agreed to Berkshire lifting its ownership above the original 10% ceiling. He also said raising the stakes further is the goal, although no increases were discussed on the trip and any decision would be reviewed back in Omaha.
In mid-September, Itochu chairman Masahiro Okafuji said Berkshire intends to hold for the long term and that he would not object to its stakes rising towards 15%. Bloomberg reported this as Berkshire considering a move to that level.
The positions are large. Berkshire's six Japanese holdings, the five trading houses plus Tokio Marine, were worth about US$44 billion on 28 August, compared with a cost for the trading-house stakes of about US$15.4 billion at the end of 2025.
There is also a practical lesson for investors who follow Berkshire's moves. Its quarterly US holdings report, known as a 13F, covers only US-listed securities, so the November report will say nothing about Japan. Under Japanese rules, once a large shareholding has been disclosed, a new report is needed only when the holding changes by one percentage point or more. Smaller additions can go unreported for some time, surfacing later in a Japanese filing or in Berkshire's annual report. Public filings show what a company owned at a point in time, not necessarily what it is doing now.
What investors can take from this
Berkshire's year offers a checklist that applies to any long-term holding. Is succession planned and communicated? Are buybacks made only when shares are cheap? Is management willing to commit capital when an industry is unpopular? And are public disclosures being read with an understanding of what they do and do not show?
None of these questions depend on short-term market moves. They are about whether a business is run in a way that allows capital to compound over many years, which is the measure that matters most for patient investors.
Jason Pohl is Managing Director at Global Masters Fund (ASX:GFL), a listed investment company. This article is general information only and does not consider any individual's investment objectives, financial situation or needs.