Register For Our Mailing List

Register to receive our free weekly newsletter including editorials.

Home / 314

10 reasons many fund managers are now blank spaces

So it's gonna be forever
Or it's gonna go down in flames
You can tell me when it's over
If the high was worth the pain
Got a long list of ex-lovers
They'll tell you I'm insane
'Cause you know I love the players
And you love the game

-Taylor Swift, Blank Space

Yes, Taylor, we loved the players and we loved the game. Swiftly, it's over, leaving a blank space.

It looks easy from the outside, but asset management is a tough game. Winners can win big, but there are far more strugglers. In a concentrated portfolio, a heavy overweight position in a losing stock can mean “it’s gonna go down in flames”.

Recently, an unprecedented number of fund managers have closed their businesses or some of their funds, including:

  • KIS Capital
  • Sigma Funds
  • JCP Investment Partners
  • Dual Momentum
  • Janus Henderson Australian equity funds
  • MHOR Asset Management
  • Discovery Asset Management
  • Denning Pryce
  • Adam Smith Asset Management
  • Concise Asset Management
  • Arnhem Investment Management
  • Ellerston Global Macro
  • Colonial First State Global Asset Management ‘Core’ funds (transferred to other managers)
  • UBS Asset Management Australian equity funds (transferred to Yarra Capital)
  • Altair Asset Management

For many years, I managed the ‘alliance’ business for Colonial First State (CFS), where we would partner with portfolio managers to establish new operations. We saw all types of potential come across our desks, from a couple of people wanting to set up their own boutique, through to large global managers establishing an Australian business.

How hard can it be? While there are some overlaps in the following reasons, here are 10 industry hurdles to overcome. These may or may not apply to the above names.

1. The growth of index investing

In 2018 in the US, passive index funds (including unlisted mutual (managed) funds and Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs)) enjoyed a net inflow of US$431 billion, while active mutual funds experienced net outflows of $418 billion, as shown below. Given the large fee difference, that represents a loss of hundreds of millions of dollars in fees to the asset management industry. It's also become widely-accepted wisdom that most active managers do not beat the index.

In Deloitte’s 2019 Investment Management Outlook, 16 of the top 20 global funds by net flows were passive mutual funds and ETFs, gathering a net US$143 billion.

Source: Bloomberg and BetaShares

In the US, it is estimated that 34% of mutual funds and ETFs are passively managed. This number is only about 12% in Australia, but momentum is well-established. Most local ETFs are index-based and in the final quarter of FY2019, ETFs listed on the ASX exceeded $50 billion for the first time.

It is not only the fund flows that hurt active managers, but the price competition. Institutions can achieve index management on large portfolios for 1 or 2 basis points (0.01 to 0.02%), forcing active managers to compete as low as 20 basis points (0.2%). It is difficult to finance a fully-functioning active operation of portfolio managers, analysts and support functions at such low fees unless billions of dollars are held. Even a good $250 million mandate would bring in only $500,000, which would barely cover the cost of a senior portfolio manager.

2. In-house management by large institutions

Many of the largest superannuation funds in Australia are boosting their in-house asset management capabilities and withdrawing mandates from external managers. The most high-profile in the last year was AustralianSuper’s move of $7.7 billion internally from Perpetual Investments, Fidelity International and Alphinity Investment Management. These are not small boutiques but long-term successful fund managers with substantial operations of their own.

CIO, Mark Delaney, explained the change:

“We found there was an overlap in the shares held by the different managers. Over the last three or four years, we found that in Australian equities, in terms of the stocks held, we had the same stocks in the top 50 and these holdings did not change much. This is the nature of the Australian market. It has a narrow number of stocks and a narrow number of sectors.”

Currently, about 58% of AustralianSuper’s Australian equities assets are managed internally, and most of the external management is in the cheaper index funds.

The large superannuation funds now attract top talent receiving market-comparable salaries. While most of the leading CIOs could earn more in the private sector, the super sector’s guaranteed inflows, stability of funding, lack of need to continually pitch for new money and clarity of a single stakeholder appeal to many. The top-earning CIOs in Australian super funds (according to Investment Magazine) are:

3. Extreme variations in performance

Most investors are prepared to tolerate short-term underperformance from their fund manager, but others are impatient and bale out after a year or two. It’s worse when the manager has a significantly-poor year.

The financial year 2018/2019 experienced some rapid price rises in companies where investors were willing to bank on future growth, including the Top 5 for the year: Nearmap (ASX:NEA) up 233%, Clinuvel (ASX:CUV) up 206%, Afterpay (ASX:APT) up 168%, Magellan (ASX:MFG) up 119% and Appen (ASX:APX) up 109%.

Managers without these types of high flyers in their portfolio have experienced significant underperformance as they stick to their valuation principles. For example, consider the NAOS Small Cap Opportunities Company (ASX:NSC). It operates under a Listed Investment Company (LIC) structure. In its April 2019 Investment Report, in explaining why it has not invested in these big winners, it says:

“… the main concern for us is the significant faith that is being placed in the earnings trajectory of these businesses for many years into the future.”

As NAOS admits, the permanent capital of a LIC has protected it from heavy redemptions, due to this relative performance.

The Zenith 2019 Australian Shares Long/Short Sector Report for the year to 31 March 2019 reported an average return of 5.2% for the funds they rate, versus 11.7% for the S&P/ASX300 Accumulation Index. Zenith Investment Analyst Jacob Smart said:

“In 2018, the spread between the cheapest and most expensive stocks reached record highs and, even after the fourth quarter correction last year, remained at elevated levels. The cheaper segment of the market continued to become even cheaper throughout 2018.”

4. Managing with an out-of-favour style

Every fund manager must have fundamental beliefs about how to manage money and select investments. The most obvious style variation is ‘growth versus value’, and others such as ‘small cap versus large cap’ and ‘long/short versus long only’ move in and out of favour.

Growth has been rewarded for at least five years as the market chases companies with blue sky earnings potential, even when the revenues are not yet realised. The WAAAX stocks are all classic examples, where the market assigns massive P/E valuations and two of them do not even make a profit. Value managers look for companies which are inexpensive relative to a fundamental value, with sustainable earnings and low valuations, such as ‘buying $1 of value for 80 cents’.

According to JP Morgan, there has never been a worse time to be a value investor. In the US, value stocks are trading at the largest discount to the market in history. They measure the median forward P/E ratio of value stocks in the S&P500 and compare it with the broader S&P500 and the spread is now at a record 7 points.

Another segment which is out-of-favour is small cap investing, trailing large cap. As shown below, in the last 10 years, the S&P/ASX100 index has substantially outperformed the Small Ordinaries index, leaving many small cap managers struggling to deliver decent returns.

S&P/ASX Small Ordinaries Index vs S&P/ASX100 Index, 10 years to 30 June 2019

Source: Bloomberg, CFSGAM. Cumulative total returns 30 June 2009 to 30 June 2019.

Long/short investing is also battling on with many casualties. KIS Capital launched in 2009 and its funds peaked at around $300 million, but it closed recently after a difficult 2018 where results were “disappointing”. It advised its clients:

"Given the state of the market, KIS Capital directors have concluded that the best course of action at this point is for us to close both funds and return capital to all investors on an equitable basis.”

5. Inadequate marketing and distribution

Build it and they may not come. Most fund managers would prefer to sit at a desk all day, study their screens and analyse companies. However, especially in a small boutique which relies on the profile of one or two managers, they must wear out the shoe leather and tell their story. It’s a tricky balance. Their main skill may be stock picking, but they need to become extrovert marketers, not simply hire a Business Development Manager with a Rolodex. They must establish themselves as thought leaders.

Research by leading consultants, Tria Partners, concludes:

“… thought leadership is the single most important factor that underpins improvement of buyers’ understanding and perception of external asset managers – i.e. it’s the most value-adding activity marketing can undertake.”

Significant resources are needed to cover institutions, middle market gatekeepers and retail sectors properly. Many fund managers have realised in recent years that they need a direct conversation with end investors, and they particularly target SMSF trustees. The combined value of ETFs and LICs listed on the ASX is now $100 billion, and SMSF trustees often manage their own portfolios directly through the listed market. Previously, some managers confined their marketing to institutional investors, believing it was better to win a $100 million mandate than source thousands of smaller investments. Now those mandates are drying up, the fees are lower and the competition is intense. Marketing through dealer groups to find financial advisers is also not enough, as increasingly, advisers are acting independently and not following the central directive of an Approved Product List.

Tria released the following research on the most effective forms of marketing.

6. Lack of institutional and retail investor support

When MHOR Asset Management announced the closure of its Australian Small Cap Fund in June 2019, it advised:

“… it has not been able to grow the funds under management to a sustainable level and does not expect any material growth in the short-medium term … We will commence the realisation of the Fund’s assets, which is consistent with an orderly closure of the Fund.”

The Fund had achieved an impressive annualised return of 24.2% net of fees since inception on 1 August 2016, managed by former Vocus CEO James Spenceley and former Renaissance Asset Management Portfolio Manager, Gary Rollo. MHOR was added to the ASX's mFund service in 2018 to improve investor access, but they gathered only $25 million in total. Clearly, the problem is not simply a performance or access issue.

At CFS, when we assessed portfolio managers wanting to set up a new boutique, we would always check whether they had any major institution willing to back them. Often, these portfolio managers worked at large wealth businesses managing many billions of client capital across multiple portfolios. They developed close relationships with their clients and became friendly with each other. A nod and a wink from a large investor can lead people to believe if they set up on their own, then maybe a $200 million slice could seed a new fund. New boutiques will often offer clients a fee discount to come in at the start, and $200 million at 0.3% is a healthy $600,000 to cover some fixed costs. The test comes when the portfolio manager actually leaves.

When John Sevior departed Perpetual Investments to set up Airlie, many clients went with him. But John Sevior is one of the few ‘rock star’ managers in Australia. If a new boutique cannot deliver immediate institutional support, it can take years of pitching and building up a track record before decent money flows. The retail market is a tough slog full of gatekeepers who must support the new business long before a fund features on a major platform. Research analysts, rating agencies and asset allocators all need convincing.

Going directly to a LIC is difficult for fund managers without a proven track record. Although this looks like direct-to-market distribution, behind the scenes are brokers and financial advisers who are paid fees to support the issue, and they must be convinced there is a story to tell.

7. Misunderstanding the business model

Portfolio managers in large businesses are supported by a phalanx of helpers, from accounting, tech, call centre, compliance, legal, documentation, marketing, business development … on it goes. They can indulge their passion for investing.

Then they set up their own businesses. Suddenly, they become involved in finding premises, negotiating leases, hiring staff, selecting systems to prevent cyber attacks, finding new investors … and all the drudgery of owning a business where the buck stops with the founder. What a pain! Previously, they were Masters of the Universe in a big dealing room, where they blasted the tech guys if the internet went down for 10 minutes. Now the fundies are responsible for making sure their tech is good, and there’s nobody on staff to shout at.

Which is why many talented fund managers sell part of their equity to groups like Pinnacle, Fidante, Channel Capital or Bennelong. In exchange for say 40% ownership, these companies provide support services for boutique managers, leaving them to focus more on investment management. They still need to perform a marketing role but it is done with considerable business development support.

How much does it cost to open the doors? It depends mainly on how much the portfolio managers pay themselves. Remember, many have been highly paid in a previous role and have big mortgages and private school fees to cover, so it’s not easy to take the startup route of no salary for a couple of years. So let’s say they are senior portfolio managers on $500,000 (if that seems too much, consider the salaries of the super fund CIOs listed above, and the CIO of a major retail business can earn $5 million or more a year). Let’s say three other staff cost $500,000, then there are premises, systems, legal, advertising, etc. There’s not much change out of $50,000 to be a major sponsor at a leading industry event. That’s a total of $2 million on the credit card.

Revenues come from clients paying fees. Not only are the big clients pushing down fees, but retail investors can access funds management for free (products such as HostPlus Balanced Indexed Fund - the ‘Scott Pape Fund’ – are effectively free, and the cost of many index ETFs is negligible, less than 0.1%). This new boutique business will need, say, $300 million of institutional money at 0.3% and $300 million of retail money at 0.4% to break even. That is not easy in a market with hundreds of competitors all essentially doing the same thing while striving to sound different.

And the sobering outlook is that for most fund managers, fees are only going in one direction.

8. Inadequate product diversity

Many small fund managers have only one fund based on the skills of one or two people. For the first few years, all their efforts will go into promoting and managing that one fund. It leaves them vulnerable to poor performance and an out-of-favour style. Which is why larger managers branch into income funds, infrastructure, alternatives, ethical or a completely different asset class like an equity manager hiring a fixed interest specialist. The diversity can reduce the business risk.

A comment on relying on performance fees to make a profit. Not only are the fees elusive in a period of underperformance, but such fees are usually structured with a ‘high water mark’. This means the previous underperformance must be recovered before the fee kicks in again. Therefore, a poor year can set back the profitability of the business for many years.

9. Loss of key personnel

Funds management is an industry with massive key person risk. Especially in small boutiques, there are often one or two portfolio managers who have investor support, backed by talented analysts and trainees with little or no market profile or reputation. As funds under management grows, the team increases and resilience builds for long-term survival.

Until this point is reached, however, if the main man or woman wants to leave, the business has nowhere to go. It’s simply not possible to bring in a new person at short notice and expect investors to stay.

The highest-profile demise of all was the closure in 2010 of 452 Capital when Peter Morgan was misdiagnosed with brain cancer. Peter was a doyen of fund managers following his time at Perpetual (Disclosure: I set up the CFS alliance with 452 and was on the Board for a while). At its peak, 452 Capital managed $9 billion, rapidly raising money from 2001. But much of the money exited during Morgan’s time off and with the impact of the GFC, the remaining staff were managing less than $3 billion when the business closed. The Sydney Morning Herald reported:

“Yesterday another high-profile Australian business in this industry, 452 Capital, became the talk of the financial services industry when it was revealed that this business had essentially imploded.”

Fast forward to the recent closures. In 2019, when the AFR reported that Discovery Asset Management was returning funds to its clients, it said the move was driven by the co-founder and Managing Director, Stuart Jordan’s decision to retire. A message to clients said:

"Over the last week, Stuart has cemented his decision to head down the retirement path after a long and successful career in the Australian investment management industry. Given this, and also that Discovery have a small number of institutional clients (only), we have communicated to each of them that Stuart is planning to retire, and we are now working with these institutional clients to 'hand back' or transition out, their mandates with Discovery.”

It is believed that the loss of a mandate from UniSuper contributed to the decision.

A larger ($5 billion under management) and long-established business, Ellerston Capital, closed its Global Macro Fund in June 2019, following the departures of economist Tim Toohey and one of the portfolio managers, Robert Chiu. This was not an under-resourced fund. Former Reserve Bank Governor, Glenn Stevens, was an adviser, with Ellerston announcing on his hire:

"Our main focus is on his international perspective and how other central banks see their economies. He's here to challenge and debate all of our investment theses".

The Head of the Global Macro Fund, Brett Gillespie, is himself a high-profile figure, frequent presenter at conferences and writer of a detailed monthly newsletter on global macro conditions. Yet the loss of key clients took the Fund from $190 million to $30 million and not commercially viable. Returns since inception in 2017 were flat, as shown below.

10. Failure to manage expectations

Every fund manager will underperform at times, but not every fund manager faces large redemptions. Those who emerge into better markets have often spent years explaining their process and when it might not work, and why it will pay off to stay with them.

One manager who has experienced torrid performance in the last year is Steve Johnson’s Forager. A year ago, its LIC was so popular that it was trading at a premium, and his presentations filled conference rooms. The net asset value of the Australian Shares Fund has fallen from $1.82 a year ago to $1.30 now (after a $0.21 distribution). That’s a fall of 19% in a market that is up 12%, a whopping 31% underperformance. Making it worse, the LIC now trades at a discount as some investors have exited, but also as LICs generally have struggled.

Forager has been at pains in the past to stress its investment approach is to buy out-of-favour or unpopular companies, and to ride out the recovery. It has warned that company turnarounds can take longer than expected, and this has been the case. In its recent newsletter, Johnson said:

Since we started Forager almost 10 years ago, we have told our investors to expect significant periods of underperformance. That’s one promise we have delivered on over the past year ... We have made genuine mistakes over the past year. Part of our poor performance has nothing to do with industry turmoil. But periods of dramatic underperformance like this are not just part of investing with us. They are an essential prerequisite to future outperformance.”

Forager is supported by believers prepared to wait for better days, although it helps that the main fund is a LIC with permanent capital.

Why does this matter to you?

There are three reasons why investors may be adversely impacted by a fund closure, putting aside the impact on the lives of the staff directly affected.

1. Costs of realising the portfolio

Although a small cap manager may not own a substantial portfolio in the overall size of the market, it may be a significant shareholder in some small companies. When it is announced that the funds business will close, the market knows there is a substantial seller of certain companies and the bid price can drop away rapidly. Spreads open. So in addition to other closure costs such as brokerage, the value of the portfolio may fall during liquidation. And, of course, anyone else who owns those stocks will also be hit.

Even where a fund is not closed but transferred to another manager, using a 'transition manager' to sell the old portfolio and buy a new one, the realisation costs can be substantial as most transition managers just want to do the job and move on.

2. Unplanned capital gains or losses

Money is returned unexpectedly to investors, and this might deliver a taxable capital gain or a capital loss which cannot be tax-effectively managed at a convenient time.

3. Lack of access to liquidity while the fund closes

Most fund managers announce their closure and immediately suspend redemptions to prevent a run and to allow for a more orderly share sale process. Investors wanting the capital for other purposes may be denied the expected liquidity.

Briefly, on the other hand …

In case this article paints too glum a picture for fund managers, let’s mention the other extreme, Magellan (ASX:MFG). Its funds under management at 30 June 2019 reached $86 billion, up an extraordinary $4 billion in one month since 31 May 2019. This was mainly due to market movements and the fall in the AUD, but retail inflows were $132 million and institutional $356 million across global, Australian and infrastructure assets. A year earlier, on 30 June 2018, funds totalled $59 billion. That’s up $27 billion in one year.

But here’s the clincher to show how wonderful (or cruel) this business can be for creating wealth. On 2 March 2009, Magellan shares reached a low of 33 cents during the GFC. It recently traded at $55. Ignoring dividends, buying 10,000 shares for $3,300 would now be worth $550,000, only a decade later. Market capitalisation (gulp!): $10 billion.

To offer hope to the strugglers, I remember when Hamish Douglass and Frank Casarotti could gather only a couple of dozen people to Magellan's presentations, and CFS refused to put their global fund onto the main FirstChoice platform.


Graham Hand is Managing Editor of Firstlinks. This article is general information and does not consider the circumstances of any individual.


Gary M
August 11, 2019

Feel sorry for any bond manager setting up now. How much further can rates go with 10-year below 1%.

August 10, 2019

Excellent article Graham.

Greatly appreciate the analysis, construct, and insights on the changing dynamics of the wealth industry.

Ken Jackson
August 10, 2019

Being a person with an spasmodic interest in the financial world, I put off reading this article thinking it might get too technical. But it was an easy read.
Thanks for the article Graham, it gave me an insight into the struggles that some funds many have. Maybe I will have more empathy for those funds I have invested in.

P Bull
August 10, 2019

Graham – nice work.

Managers are either more interested in making money from their investments or from their clients.

Some of the smaller ones close (or never open) for “good” reasons (insert Buffett example). Some of the bigger ones … well … the beast will be fed or it will starve and there are plenty of examples of both.

There is also the pastoral life in outer Pennsylvania, where there is no human to blame when things go wrong. That may not line up with investor preferences when it comes to it.

August 10, 2019

Just one error in your article re MHOR performance, they didn’t do 24% pa, I think you’ll find you mistook total return for annualised return as they were up +20% total to Feb 2019 so pretty sure they weren’t running at 24% pa when they closed. Big difference bw 24% pa and 24% over 3 years!

Graham Hand
August 10, 2019

Thanks, Barry, but if there’s an error, it’s because of MHOR’s advice to its clients, not mine. Appreciate you telling me there is a difference between 24% pa and 24% over three years.

Here is the exact wording of their closure announcement sent to clients on 18 June 2019:

“As at 31 May 2019, the Fund has achieved an annualised return of 24.22% (net of fees) since the fund’s inception 1 August 2016.”

Patricia Cross
August 10, 2019

This is an excellent analysis of the pitfalls of asset management. And the only problem with the excellent Magellan performance is my husband is the one who made that investment—much “I told you so”!

Andrew Varlamos
August 10, 2019

Terrific article, Graham.

The asset management industry globally is in the midst of a serious disruption, as money inexorably shifts to passive.

The dynamics you describe in the insto market are only going to get worse: fewer and bigger buyers.

In the retail market, part of the problem for asset managers is that their products, i.e. managed funds, look like commodities. Opaque, mysterious, hard to understand, and therefore, hard to distinguish. And yet, I can’t think of any industry that is actually less like a commodity industry than active asset management: each assessment and every decision is based on human judgement, meaning, every asset manager sees a myriad number of issues differently. But, they have too few opportunities to explain how they are thinking, and therefore, how they are investing, to prospects and investors.

New technologies and business models have to solve this issue for the asset management industry, enabling them to reach the mass market of investors; explaining who they are, how they are thinking, and therefore, how they are investing.

And the best place to do this is in a direct-to-consumer, online marketplace, enabling investors to compare and contrast amongst the different providers. (Which is exactly why we have built!). ??

Andrew Varlamos

James Waggett
August 10, 2019

Andrew, a great investment advisor will understand the value proposition of each of their preferred active managers, across multiple asset classes, whether listed or unlisted.

Few self directed investors have the time or inclination to perform such DD which is why partnering with such an adviser rather than doing it yourself remains the preferred modus operandum for so many HNW / sophisticated investors.

Whether the retail market embraces your active approach, or prefers a form of robo-advice, remains to be seen.

James Waggett
August 10, 2019

Andrew, a great investment advisor will understand the value proposition of each of their preferred active managers, across multiple asset classes, whether listed or unlisted.

Few self directed investors have the time or inclination to perform such DD which is why partnering with such an adviser rather than doing it yourself remains the preferred modus operandum for so many HNW / sophisticated investors.

Whether the retail market embraces your active approach, or prefers a form of robo-advice, remains to be seen.

August 10, 2019

Truly remarkable and well written article giving us an insight of the challenges facing the fund management industry. Just wanted to say a big THANK YOU for the excellent content. Thoroughly enjoyed reading it!

August 10, 2019

No doubt MFG has been an amazing success story, but it’s interesting too given all these industry headwinds to try and rationalise a share price north of $55, and a PE ratio in the same vicinity. It seems to me to imply regular performance fees can be earned (despite all these challenges, and not so long ago MFG was not earning PF’s); that FUM growth can continue incessantly (the FUM is already too big now and must be a competitive disadvantage, to add #11 to the list); and that management fees will not be eroded (despite the consensus here that all the forces are going in that direction).

Simon Samuel
August 10, 2019

Excellent article Graham.
Hopefully over time, a variety of forces such as “animal spirits”, shareholder action, ASX regulation on minimum fund size, and even honourable action by fund governance will rationalise the group of inefficient listed funds.

Rachael Rofe
July 14, 2019

Fantastic article, Graham. Thank you!

Dugald Higgins
July 14, 2019

Great article Graham.

Jonathan Hoyle
July 12, 2019

Great article, Graham.

The most fundamental reason for the decline and fall of Active Fund Managers is their lack of performance. Now that the performance (beta) of pretty much any market can be had for as little as 0.2%, who wants to pay an active manager 1% plus to fail even to match a passive index?

At Stanford Brown, we outsource some $1.5bn of our clients' money to a mix of passive and active funds. To the latter, we politely suggest they charge our clients a fixed fee comparable with a passive fund (0.2%) plus a healthy share of any out-performance. This seems reasonable to us. But few active managers will agree to these terms. Hence, the rise and rise of Vanguard/iShares etc.

Graham Hand
July 12, 2019

Please understand that we moderate all comments, and if we feel it necessary to edit or disallow them to keep the discussion reasonable, we will. That is how every respectable comments section works.

Scott Pape
July 12, 2019

You're at the top of your game Graham, you've encapsulated the challenges facing the industry perfectly.

Index investing is by its very nature a race to the bottom in fees (assuming there's no tracking error, why pay extra for the same index?!).

I'm currently creating a financial education class for high school students, educating them on the importance of choosing a low cost high growth super fund at the start of their careers (using ASIC's MoneySmart calculator to show the impact of fees and investment mix ... and NOT mentioning any providers).

The kids get it intuitively ... hope for the next generation!

Thanks for the wonderful resource you have here, it really is first class.

Graham Hand
August 10, 2019

Hi Scott, thanks for the feedback and congratulations on your amazing book sales. Nobody would have believed a finance book could sell 1.6 million copies, because apparently, not enough people are ‘engaged’. But you showed good communication can create engagement.

July 12, 2019

Because many fund managers silently sat back & let the Union Super funds attack advisers for decades, advisers are now quite happy for some of the fund managers to take a bit of the same medicine, content to see them hang out to dry, as we advisers have been. Shackled by FOFA, Opt ins, & FASEA units/exams, fund managers remain perversely ignorant of the red tape that has been lumbered on advisers, no thanks to the Industry Super Funds who are steadily building their monopoly status. Now the fund managers are getting the short stick from the Union Super funds, it's high time they came to the rescue of advisers, & lobbied for the removal of all of the ridiculous red tape that is hampering advisers from doing their job. Until then, advisers could not care less.

August 10, 2019

Couldn’t agree more. It is the adviser, not active fund manager, sitting in front of the client justifying their higher management fees. There is no time for that anymore due to all the red tape and over-regulation…with more on the way…

Warren Bird
July 11, 2019

(Lament for a fund manager)

I knew you were trouble
You're the reason for teardrops on my guitar
Everything has changed
You say 'shake it off'
But look what you made me do
We are never getting back together
But I'm just gonna shake it off
And begin again

(And yes, those are all Taylor Swift songs. My work colleagues can't believe I'm a Tay Tay fan either!)

Lakshmi Krishnan
July 11, 2019

What a service you provide Graham week after week for the public. Each week it is a pleasure to read your article and we learn so much about the industry. You should be recognised for your services.

A very grateful reader.


Graham Hand
July 11, 2019

Thanks, Lakshmi. Very kind comment. Cheers, Graham

Belinda White
July 11, 2019

Graham writes an article quoting Taylor Swift and my life is now complete. He also makes some very strong points about funds management marketing, including this gem: "They must establish themselves as thought leaders."

Rod Thomas
July 11, 2019

Story of Australian investment markets Graham, too many people living off the backs of others, too few thought leaders - I don’t believe we are in a lower returns environment, maybe from a traditional way of looking at it, but there are many good businesses out there showing good returns, just got to return to wearing out the shoe leather again, one of my long term favourites, Technology One. At the end of the day, you cannot beat basic research.
Regards Rod

July 11, 2019

An insightful commentary Graham. One of your best articles.

Regards Bryan

July 11, 2019

Gday Graham,

Just wanted to say that your 10 reasons article made for terrific reading. Great job!



Giselle Roux
July 11, 2019

One of the most perplexing components of the Australian fund manager sector is the preponderance of performance fees. At the margin they may be acceptable where there is a highly unique offer or there is a meaningful limitation on the size of the potential FUM relative to the cost of providing the strategy.
But all too often large cap, long only, or 2-3 person small cap teams add a hefty performance fee.
There is scant evidence it results in better outcomes. Indeed surely the motivation should be to provide better returns than the index to retain and grow FUM and that does not require another fee.
They also do not align with the stated criteria for the fund. At an elementary level, annual performance fees paid while the investment time horizon is guided as 5 years.
Index funds will only grow as these fee structures persist.

July 12, 2019

Yes agreed and small cap PF's benchmarked off the small ords, which has been an easybeat per the chart above.
Base fees need to fall much further and PF's better designed, there will be more disruption to come.

July 11, 2019

Well written!!! A comment on internal management by the big super funds. There are only two super funds (not even the Future Fund) that actually manage significant funds internally that do market deals i.e. Ausy and UniSuper. This means they are able to get preferential margins on foundation opportunities which generate extra returns through quick decisions at favourable prices.

The natural extrapolation is that the larger your fum, so should your salary, however size does not necessarily mean scale where the bulk of funds use external managers. This situation in time will change as more of these managers develop their in-house capacity, which takes years.

Additionally extra fum does not necessarily mean extra internal staff. It does of course mean extra fee savings where they previously used external managers.

Duncan Niven
July 11, 2019

An excellent article; business stability is just as important as other facets of an investment product, such as its philosophy, strategy and team etc. Without understanding the drivers of a business, you leave yourself to the mercy of the manager restricting access or winding the vehicle up - usually at a time where investment performance is a secondary consideration for the fund manager.

Another aspect I find perplexing and following on from Chris's comment, is the pricing of new products - too often they are just priced off a market average rather than the quality of the offering - a high profile Australian long short manager has recently launched a long only global equity offering with no track record and no history of the individuals working together in the past - priced on our calculations it is at a 60-70% increase of all in costs (MER + perf fees if it hits objectives) - that's a whopping price to pay for something that is unproven. And they wonder why the products don't get initial traction....

July 11, 2019

Hi Graham

I really enjoyed the article as to why fund managers are quitting the market. It was the Taylor Swift song quote that was the hook.

July 11, 2019

Perhaps its time for a reality check for portfolio managers. If your expectation is/ and you are paid, $500,000 to run an active portfolio that can barely or not beat the index...….perhaps you're not worth $500,000! That'll help get the costs down

July 11, 2019

Exactly! - market dynamics can cut both ways!

July 11, 2019

when are we going to see some LICs liquidated? Some funds with vanilla holdings are discounted by 20%. surely the answer is to close the fund.

Chris Cuffe
July 10, 2019

And with ETFs/index funds providing a low cost "base line", many managers just don't get that they need to "swing the bat" (rather than hug the index) and be prepared to endure underperformance in some periods. They lock themselves into mediocrity.

Chris Cuffe
July 10, 2019

Also, newer managers just don't get we are in a lower returns fees of the past become very hard to justify as the alpha is lower. They need to avoid setting themselves up for disappointment.


Leave a Comment:



Stocks near their 52-week lows: is it time to reconsider?

Fund managers versus funds: fraternal or identical twins?

Why August company reporting season was poor


Most viewed in recent weeks

Lessons when a fund manager of the year is down 25%

Every successful fund manager suffers periods of underperformance, and investors who jump from fund to fund chasing results are likely to do badly. Selecting a manager is a long-term decision but what else?

2022 election survey results: disillusion and disappointment

In almost 1,000 responses, our readers differ in voting intentions versus polling of the general population, but they have little doubt who will win and there is widespread disappointment with our politics.

Now you can earn 5% on bonds but stay with quality

Conservative investors who want the greater capital security of bonds can now lock in 5% but they should stay at the higher end of credit quality. Rises in rates and defaults mean it's not as easy as it looks.

30 ETFs in one ecosystem but is there a favourite?

In the last decade, ETFs have become a mainstay of many portfolios, with broad market access to most asset types, as well as a wide array of sectors and themes. Is there a favourite of a CEO who oversees 30 funds?

Betting markets as election predictors

Believe it or not, betting agencies are in the business of making money, not predicting outcomes. Is there anything we can learn from the current odds on the election results?

Meg on SMSFs – More on future-proofing your fund

Single-member SMSFs face challenges where the eventual beneficiaries (or support team in the event of incapacity) will be the member’s adult children. Even worse, what happens if one or more of the children live overseas?

Latest Updates


'It’s your money' schemes transfer super from young to old

With the Coalition losing the 2022 election, its policy to allow young people to access super goes back on the shelf. But lowering the downsizer age to 55 was supported by Labor. Check the merits of both policies.

Investment strategies

Rising recession risk and what it means for your portfolio

In this environment, safe-haven assets like Government bonds act as a diversifier given the uncorrelated nature to equities during periods of risk-off, while offering a yield above term deposit rates.

Investment strategies

‘Multidiscipline’: the secret of Bezos' and Buffett’s wild success

A key attribute of great investors is the ability to abstract away the specifics of a particular domain, leaving only the important underlying principles upon which great investments can be made.


Keep mandatory super pension drawdowns halved

The Transfer Balance Cap limits the tax concessions available in super pension funds, removing the need for large, compulsory drawdowns. Plus there are no requirements to draw money out of an accumulation fund.


Confession season is upon us: What’s next for equity markets

Companies tend to pre-position weak results ahead of 30 June, leading to earnings downgrades. The next two months will be critical for investors as a shift from ‘great expectations’ to ‘clear explanations’ gets underway.


Australia, the Lucky Country again?

We may have been extremely unlucky with the unforgiving weather plaguing the East Coast of Australia this year. However, on the economic front we are by many measures in a strong position relative to the rest of the world.

Exchange traded products

LIC discounts widening with the market sell-off

Discounts on LICs and LITs vary with market conditions, and many prominent managers have seen the value of their assets fall as well as discount widen. There may be opportunities for gains if discounts narrow.



© 2022 Morningstar, Inc. All rights reserved.

The data, research and opinions provided here are for information purposes; are not an offer to buy or sell a security; and are not warranted to be correct, complete or accurate. Morningstar, its affiliates, and third-party content providers are not responsible for any investment decisions, damages or losses resulting from, or related to, the data and analyses or their use. Any general advice or ‘regulated financial advice’ under New Zealand law has been prepared by Morningstar Australasia Pty Ltd (ABN: 95 090 665 544, AFSL: 240892) and/or Morningstar Research Ltd, subsidiaries of Morningstar, Inc, without reference to your objectives, financial situation or needs. For more information refer to our Financial Services Guide (AU) and Financial Advice Provider Disclosure Statement (NZ). You should consider the advice in light of these matters and if applicable, the relevant Product Disclosure Statement before making any decision to invest. Past performance does not necessarily indicate a financial product’s future performance. To obtain advice tailored to your situation, contact a professional financial adviser. Articles are current as at date of publication.
This website contains information and opinions provided by third parties. Inclusion of this information does not necessarily represent Morningstar’s positions, strategies or opinions and should not be considered an endorsement by Morningstar.

Website Development by Master Publisher.