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War can’t be good, can it?

What’s war good for? With apologies to Motown songwriters Norman Whitfield and Barrett Strong, absolutely nothing from humanity’s point of view.

While the human cost of conflict - measured in lives lost, families displaced, and immense suffering - is profound and undeniable, the historical relationship between geopolitical chaos and long-term equity market valuations is remarkably detached.

This is perhaps because markets grind on, focused on profits and with what appears to be indifference to the tragedies that dominate the headlines.

Historically, at least, equity markets decline ahead of conflict as investors brace for the unknown, but rally during it, often led by rotations into sectors or industries that profit from the chaos.

Today, many investors are asking whether the current Middle East conflict will reveal markets to be equally resilient (and indifferent).

Before we dive in, it’s worth making a few observations about the current conflict in the Middle East.

The first is the resulting oil supply shock is likely to trigger price rises across many goods. It is already increasing the price of money as interest rates rise, and in so doing, causing the cost of capital to rise.

This can have consequences for merger financing, which in turn will hurt deals, hurt the prospects for bailouts, and, through the impact on the very wealthy, challenge confidence in political leaders worldwide, especially those aligned with Trump.

In fact, it’s reasonable to conclude that many of the follow-on effects of this supply shock are adverse, including the impact on living standards across the world.

The World Wars’ impact on markets

During the two World Wars, the US stock markets generally performed positively despite initial panic. In World War I (1914–1918), following a 30% drop when markets reopened after the war broke out, the Dow Jones rebounded significantly, rising 88% in 1915 alone and finishing the period with a 43% gain (8.7% annualised).

In World War II, despite a 4.37% drop after Pearl Harbour and volatile periods like the fall of France, the Dow gained 50% (7% per year) by the end of the conflict.

Importantly, the United States’ entry into World War II saw equity markets reach their low point in 143 days and return to higher ground within a year.

Combined, equity markets displayed resilience through high volatility, often turning early losses into long-term gains.

Despite these encouraging stats for investors, I think it’s reasonable to ask whether a world war in 2026 or 2027 would result in equally resilient stock markets. Drones, autonomous soldiers, artificial intelligence (AI) and the ever-present threat of nuclear ‘solutions’ make World War III a far less palatable prospect, even for investors.

But the current conflict in the Middle East is not a world war and doesn’t appear to bear the essential ingredients for one to start. Yet. A defining feature of world wars is the formal commitment of multiple global superpowers to fight on behalf of their allies. And unlike the pre-nuclear era of 1914 or 1939, the presence of nuclear weapons among major powers (the U.S., Israel, Russia, and China) acts as a catastrophic deterrent.

2026: the year of diversification

I’ve written extensively about the current Middle East conflict, oil, US inflation, AI, the associated SaaSpocalypse, US debt, Gold and the de-dollarisation trade, and long bond yields. And while many of those topics allude to the need for diversification, we were also much more specific. Earlier this year, I explained that 2026 would be the year when investors would benefit from some earlier tactical diversification into investments uncorrelated with public markets – such as private markets and alternative investments.

The arguments were relatively straightforward: an unpredictable US president, mid-term election years tending to be tougher for equities - especially between May and September, weaker equity markets and larger drawdowns during Republican presidencies going back 125 years, a fourth consecutive strong year in equity markets being an exception and very stretched stock market valuations.

With the S&P 500 down 7.14% and the ASX 200 down 3.23% year to date, there’s not much in returns, so far, worth writing home about. But the S&P 500 is now down 8.7% from its 2025 high and the ASX 200 is 8.2% lower.

Quality suffers

Perhaps that, and the palpable investor anxiety, as well as the poor showing by quality-biased active equity managers (Table 1), especially over the six and 12 months to the end of February 2026, is worth writing about.

Table 1. Australian quality-biased active manager performance

Table 1 highlights the recent challenges faced by quality-based managers in Australia. Over three months and six months, the ASX-listed domestic quality-based exchange traded fund (ETF) has materially underperformed the S&P/ASX 200 Accumulation Index. Over three, six and twelve months, all active quality-based active managers have underperformed the broader index.

Keen observers will note the Aus Quality ETF actually outperformed the broad index over 12 months (16.84% vs 16.19%), suggesting that while active managers might have struggled with idiosyncratic factors, the broader ‘quality’ factor held up slightly better over the full year before deteriorating in the more recent 3-to-6-month window.

The recent performance of active managers is driven by three specific market dynamics that typically disadvantage the ‘quality’ investment style.

The first is that the ASX 200 is heavily weighted toward Financials and Materials (Mining).

If the broader market is driven by a surge in cyclical sectors - such as a spike in iron ore prices or a recovery in banks - the Index will climb rapidly, and with quality managers typically avoiding highly cyclical or capital-intensive companies, their portfolios will naturally fall behind.

Secondly, ‘quality’ stocks - those, for example, with high Return on Equity (ROE) and stable earnings - often trade at a premium, and in periods where the market favours value or questions growth, those premiums will contract, as they have done recently.

Table 1., reveals a particularly harsh 6-month period for managers, which suggests a questioning of, and sharp rotation away from, quality earnings toward other market segments, in this case energy, materials and businesses less likely to be disrupted by AI.

Finally, there’s interest-rate sensitivity for quality companies because their growth premium is vulnerable to rapid rises in interest rates or bond yields. The present value of their future cash flows is discounted more heavily, which leads to a "de-rating" of quality stocks even if the underlying companies are performing well operationally.

Recent conflicts and returns

In February 2022, when Russian tanks rolled into Ukraine, the S&P 500 subsequently sold off 16%, bottoming in June 2022 before rallying 16.5% and then beginning a more significant decline into October 2022 as interest rates were raised to fight the inflation after-effects of COVID-19.

During that period, the domestic ASX 200 fell 3% between 18 and 25 of February, rallied 7.5% over the next two weeks, and then declined 14% to the end of September 2022 in sympathy with overseas markets and in reaction to rising interest rates.

Given persistent inflation and the central bank responses globally, we cannot say with certainty how much of the moves were related to the war in Ukraine.

What we can say, however, is that interest rates were also a factor in many other past geopolitical conflicts, and despite this, a pattern emerges that might give investors some encouragement. We can also say that rising or high rates are a familiar factor today as the Middle East conflict devolves.

Table 2. S&P500 response to geopolitical events

As Table 2, reveals, data provided by market strategist Ryan Detrick at LPL Financial, a leading US wealth management firm, highlight the resilience of equity markets across decades of volatility. In his 2022 analysis of 22 major non-financial shocks dating back to the attack on Pearl Harbour, Detrick found that the immediate market reaction was often a brief, sharp dip followed by a swift recovery.

On average, these events triggered a one-day loss of just over 1%, with total drawdowns bottoming out at less than 5%. Of course, that’s already been exceeded in this 2026 conflict, revealing the limitations of averages. Perhaps most surprising, however, is the speed of past rebounds; it typically took fewer than twenty days to hit the floor and only about six weeks to bounce back entirely.

This pattern of resilience is heavily influenced by geography and economic scale. The United States enjoys a unique position as an isolated superpower, making existential threats to its currency or markets relatively low compared with those of more vulnerable nations.

The historical record for smaller or more centrally located countries is grimmer; investors in Poland in 1939 or Russia in 1906 faced catastrophic losses that were not easily erased by a quick market bounce. Furthermore, while a country like Russia has a gross domestic product (GDP) comparable to Canada’s - a relatively small piece of the global pie - the danger lies in how a localised conflict might escalate or disrupt broader supply chains.

It’s worth acknowledging a small economic engine like Iran can still throw a massive spanner into the global works if the war expands beyond its initial borders, adversely impacting supply chains, which the current conflict has already done.

Ultimately, the takeaway for today’s equity investor is not to become callous or complacent, but to recognise the danger of making emotional trades based on the morning's headlines. Drawing a straight line from a tragic news event to a portfolio strategy is a path fraught with error, as markets have a storied habit of stumbling over the immediate headline only to return to focusing on profit growth and thematics a few weeks later.

Despite the constant hum of geopolitical commentary in our news feeds, successfully trading on these forecasts remains notoriously difficult. Markets are inherently forward-looking, and they tend to prioritise commerce over the temporary, albeit terrifying, noise of conflict.

And history seems to favour investors who consider a five-or ten-year view and take advantage of the chaos, rather than those who react emotionally.

Further encouragement

For committed share market investors and those for whom a ‘tactical’ response is anathema, it’s still worth knowing the pattern of historic returns, particularly what tends to happen after a very weak year.

As Table 3, shows, very weak years in markets are usually followed by very good years. In fact, since 1950, there have been sixty years that produced returns of greater than -5%. Notably, however, there have been sixteen years in which the S&P500 has fallen by more than 5%.

Of those 16 years in which the S&P500 fell by more than 5%, only three were followed by another negative year. Of all negative years greater than 5%, 81% were followed by a positive year and all but two produced a return greater than 15%.


Source: LPL Research, Montgomery

Conclusion

If the Middle East conflict proves to be as temporary as weak stock market years, investors could be cheering - as history suggests markets may recover more quickly than expected.

At the same time, markets often detach from the human reality of these events, making emotional reactions costly.

For investors, the lesson is to remain disciplined, avoid emotional decisions, and ensure their portfolios are thoughtfully diversified.

 

Roger Montgomery is the Founder and Chairman of Montgomery Investment Management, a leading Australian boutique investment manager, which offers investors access to high-quality investment strategies in Australian equities, private credit, and digital assets. Roger is widely regarded as one of Australia’s most insightful professional investors and thought leaders. He is the author of the best-selling investment guide Value.able and is a well-known media personality in Australia.

For more information, contact the Montgomery Team on (02) 8046 5000 or [email protected] or visit www.montinvest.com

Sign up for Roger’s insights at www.rogermontgomery.com

This article is for general information only and does not consider the circumstances of any individual.

 

  •   8 April 2026
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15 Comments
CC
April 12, 2026

The issue is not drillling but refineries !
We used to have many more oil refineries than the last 2 that are remaining but the big problem is that labour costs are much higher here than in Asia and the Australian public would much rather pay $1.50 per litre for petrol from Asia than $2.50 for petrol from Australia. Therein lies the big problem.

James Gruber
April 09, 2026

I think it's useful to make a distinction between supply and demand driven oil shocks.

The Iran war is a supply driven shock. So was 1973-1974, and the S&P 500 dropped 15% in '73 and 26% in '74.

Most other episodes have been demand driven and are different beasts.

5
Acton
April 10, 2026

"Hope springs eternal" means that people consistently maintain optimism and continue hoping for better circumstances, even in difficult or unlikely situations. I think it came from Pope's "An Essay on Man", and highlights the resilient, enduring nature of human optimism. Particularly for us SMSF share investors.

4
Bruce
April 10, 2026

I may have misunderstood the above. But I couldn't see any clear examples of the markets getting ahead after the rebound. Maybe it was vaguely hidden in the red arrows in table at the bottom.
The vibe was generally "yes, markets fall, but you'll get back to where you started at some point". That's not getting ahead. The title of the article is misleading.
In the second paragraph, only a small amount of words were dedicated to recognising the catastrophic impact on real humans. Both in the conflict zones and around the world. It's a bit distasteful to even write this piece.
Overall, I get the sense it was written by a fund manager nervous about the $$$ walking out the door. A previous comment mentioned SPIVA, which the author would also be nervous when comparing his funds.

4
john
April 09, 2026

Would be fascinating if it were possible to see what would have happened if such as Harris had been elected.
I assume the world would not be in this current situation.
It sort of points also to a future where we have to eventually get off much of the addiction to oil and move substantially to EVs and the like even if can never be done completely, it can be done to a substantial amount
Ah, but we're not talking about the Epstein files anymore, so, Mission Accomplished!
Australia could be the next Venezuela style target if we displease trump by continuing to purchase chinese made EVs - ?Just remember my prediction

1
Martin
April 09, 2026

I doubt if I've got the brain space to remember everyones/opinions predictions, and they never remind you when they were wrong

2
Michael2
April 09, 2026

will Cuba get the brunt of any Epstein files revival in interest?

2
Baljit
April 13, 2026

So I assume Elon musk was right from 2023 that US must discount all US citizens to have EV and Trump being trump said big fat NO.I believe the terrorist funding is also largely supported by oil rich countries( not all) since 2000.So this EV adoption acceleration must be supported by all nations to get rid of oil blackmail.

jeff o
April 09, 2026

Your analysis assumes the US and its allies are "winners"...and few spillovers.!!!

An alternative view of "wars"....from Prof Chellaney and the IMF modelling to be release in the next week

Why Iran is beating the US....The age of relatively cost-free US wars is over By Brahma Chellaney

In a rambling address to the American people on Wednesday last week, US President Donald Trump said that the US war against Iran has been a success, vowing to “finish the job ... very fast.”

It was a statement in obvious conflict with the facts. Trump is still pretending that Iran is just another small US adversary that can only absorb punishment, lash out locally, and ultimately buckle under sustained military and economic coercion. In reality, Iran has upended the model on which US interventionism has long relied.

For decades, the US has nurtured the belief that it could wage wars abroad without exposing itself to the risk of serious retaliation. This was made possible by the careful selection of targets — such as Grenada, Panama, Iraq, Libya and even Venezuela — that lacked the capacity to impose significant costs beyond their borders, such as by striking US assets or allies in a sustained or meaningful way. Even when insurgencies wore down US forces, as in Vietnam and Afghanistan, the conflicts remained geographically contained.


Illustration: Mountain People
This “asymmetric cost” model — a war the US starts would ultimately cost the other side far more — has proven vital in sustaining the illusion of US invincibility and limiting domestic political resistance to US military adventurism. Now, Iran has broken it.

Iran’s security doctrine is built on “forward defense,” which makes use of asymmetric military capabilities — including ballistic and cruise missiles, drones, and a network of partners and proxies — to protect itself and project power beyond its borders. When the US and Israel attacked, Iran was able to leverage this strategic depth to retaliate immediately against targets across the region, including US allies, military bases and forward-deployed assets.

By threatening infrastructure, airbases and economic chokepoints, such as the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb across the Gulf, Iran is forcing US partners to share the costs of conflict. As the Gulf states, which have long hosted US bases in exchange for a place under the US’ vaunted security umbrella, bear the brunt of Iran’s response, strategic friction is growing within Washington’s coalition. Thanks to Iran, allies that once enabled the US to project power in the Middle East now have a strong incentive to restrain it.

The US should have seen this coming. Following the US assassination of Quds Force commander Qassem Suleimani in 2020, Iran responded not with proxy action or deniable escalation, but with a direct ballistic-missile attack on a US military installation: the Al-Asad Airbase in Iraq. This should have dispelled any doubt that Iran could retaliate against US forces with precision and without fear of immediate retribution. Since then, Iran has only refined its strategy of distributed retaliation.

The Trump administration failed to anticipate this perfectly predictable response partly because of another longstanding illusion among US military planners and politicians: That higher military spending automatically confers battlefield superiority. The US could strike its “enemies” with such overwhelming force that they would have no choice but to heed its demands almost immediately. Yet, from the Vietnam War to the 20-year war in Afghanistan, the US has instead found itself trapped in expensive wars of attrition that it could neither decisively win nor politically sustain, resulting in its humiliating withdrawal.

Nonetheless, the illusion has persisted. With Iran’s defense budget amounting to a small fraction of the US’, the Trump administration apparently assumed that the country could not possibly put up much of a fight. What it failed to recognize is that Iran does not need parity; it needs disruption. Its arsenal of low-cost, high-impact systems is tailored not for a conventional victory, but for strategic denial. Swarms of relatively inexpensive drones or missiles can overwhelm even the most sophisticated air-defense systems, as Israel is learning.

With this strategy, Iran has turned the US’ greatest strength — its global military footprint — into a source of vulnerability. It has also exposed a fundamental weakness in the American way of war: dependence on high-value, high-cost assets that can be degraded by persistent asymmetric pressure. The imbalance is tactical and economic. The US is now being forced to spend vast sums to defend its assets and allies against weapons that cost very little to build and launch.

The US waged war on Iran with a framework honed against weaker, more isolated adversaries. It assumed that military force, combined with economic pressure, would ensure submission. Instead, it encountered a state that had spent years preparing for precisely this kind of confrontation and could absorb punishment while steadily ratcheting up the costs of escalation. Yet Trump continues to anticipate a quick capitulation.

The Trump administration’s strategic miscalculation extends beyond underestimating Iran’s retaliatory capabilities. It reflects a fundamental misreading of the nature of modern conflict. In a world of economic interconnectedness, geographically dispersed military capabilities and low-cost weapons systems, a country that appears weak in conventional terms can cause serious harm. The message is clear: The age of relatively cost-free US wars is over.

The US can still unleash overwhelming force and inflict immense devastation, but it can no longer control the consequences or contain the fallout. What Iran has demonstrated is not just resilience, but the ability of a weaker state steadily to erode a superpower’s advantages. A superpower that once felt invulnerable must now reckon with adversaries that can drain its coffers, bleed its allies and upend its strategic calculations.

The future of the Middle East — and of US power — hinges on whether the US internalizes the lessons of its miscalculation in Iran. If it fails to do so, it would continue to stumble into wars it cannot decisively win, cheaply sustain, or strategically justify.

Brahma Chellaney, professor emeritus of strategic studies at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research and Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, is the author of Water, Peace, and War: Confronting the Global Water Crisis.

From the forthcoming IMF WEO

Wars also tend to have significant spillover effects. Countries engaged in foreign conflicts may avoid large economic losses—partly because there is no physical destruction on their own soil. Yet, neighboring economies or key trading partners with the country where the conflict is taking place will feel the shock. In the early years of a conflict, these countries often experience modest declines in output.

Major conflicts—those involving at least 1,000 battle-related deaths—force difficult trade-offs in economies where they occur. Government budgets deteriorate as spending shifts toward defense and debt increases, while output and tax collection collapse.

These countries may also face strains on their external balances. As imports contract sharply because of lower demand, exports decrease even more substantially, resulting in a temporary widening of the trade deficit. Heightened uncertainty triggers capital outflows, with both foreign direct investment and portfolio flows declining. This forces wartime governments to rely more heavily on aid and, in some cases, remittances from citizens abroad to finance trade deficits.

Despite these measures, conflicts contribute to sustained exchange rate depreciation, reserve losses, and rising inflation, underscoring how widening external imbalances amplify macroeconomic stress during wartime. Prices tend to increase at a pace higher than most of central banks’ inflation targets, prompting monetary authorities to raise interest rates.

Taken together, our findings show that major conflicts impose substantial economic costs and difficult trade-offs on economies that experience conflicts within their borders, as well as hurting other countries. And these costs extend well beyond short-term disruption, with enduring consequences for both economic potential and human well-being.

1
Mark Hayden
April 10, 2026

Speculators may find value here, but Long-term investors should skim over these types of articles. The economy drives shares in the long-term.

1
Ramani
April 13, 2026

Interesting analysis relevant to investors already immersed in the markets, but there is a larger universe outside. Those not in it, those hesitant to wade in, the FOMO fearful and those convinced investment should be spelt infestment!
As humans and other creatures need to carrry on after wars have ended, eventual reversion to a semblance of the pre-war scenario seems logical.
The more interesting question: which sectors would get a bump in their demand and which would wither? And what new industries would it spawn (for example: mine-removing technology around narrow sea passages)?
Or as philosophy posits, will this too pass (or fail), as the present always looms disproprtionately relative to historical past and hypothetical future?

1
David Edwards
April 09, 2026

The above graph of recovery times is timely. The quicker an issue was resolved, the quicker and more certainly the markets rose. The Stock Market hates uncertainties. However sad the Kennedy assassinatioon, the Reagan near-assassination and the Six--Day war, at least as far as the Market is concerned, certainty returned very rapidly. The quicker the Iranian war is resolved, markets should catch up for lost time within days or weeks, rather than months.

MikeM
April 19, 2026

David notes; "The quicker the Iranian war is resolved, markets should catch up for lost time within days or weeks, rather than months'.
Even if we get some sort of ceasefire/resolution in a month's time... the ramifications will last at least a year and more likely far longer.

Alan2
April 09, 2026

A bit hard to look at war and relate it to “markets” and war given that you used the s&p as US has not been attacked and conquered or disrupted. Might be better to look at Europe’s market.

But if you indicate US and Australia’s markets as the 2 countries avoiding war in their respective lands, yes war is good.

 

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